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This paper analyzes the eects of income taxation on the behaviors of workers and rms, and the equilibrium
distribution of workers across income and wealth. The model extends the strand of literature that integrates
an equilibrium model of job search into an incomplete market model of consumption and savings. It thus
incorporates rm heterogeneity, endogenous wage oer of rms, as well as endogenous job search eort and
savings of workers. The eects of income taxes ripple through the search and savings behaviors of workers,
and the consequent response of the wage oer, which leads to additional changes in the search and savings of
workers. In the simulations across the dierent tax schemes, a higher tax progressivity is shown to depress
the motive of job search and precautionary savings and the wage oer of rms, leading to the lower average
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1 Introduction
Income taxation is a key means by which governments earn tax revenues, redistribute income and mitigate
risks and also aect the economic activities of workers and rms. Yet, on the other side, taxation distorts
incentives and undermines economic eciency. In order to evaluate the eects of a tax policy, the model
should be able to account for the changes of the economic agents' behavior in response to the changes in the
tax scheme and the consequent eects in equilibrium labor distribution and prices. In this paper, I therefore
study the eects of income taxes using the general equilibrium model where endogenously determined job
search and savings of workers and the response of heterogeneous rms aect the equilibrium stationary
distribution of workers. Specically, I analyze how the labor market outcomes such as job search eort,
savings, interest rate, wages and unemployment rate are aected when the income tax progressivity increases,
or the average income tax rates are adjusted.
The key channel of the eects of taxes in my model is the interaction between wealth accumulation and
job search in a general equilibrium setting. The model thus extends the pioneering work of Lise (2013) in the
strand of literature that integrates an equilibrium model of job search into an incomplete market model of
consumption and savings. Search includes both o- and on-the-job search, and workers are ex-ante identical.
Workers choose their search eort considering the structure of the wage ladder, and a desire for consumption
smoothing in the face of the wage ladder is associated with savings and wealth accumulation. Through their
decisions on search and savings, workers become ex-post heterogeneous. Firms then respond in their wage
oers given the optimal search and savings of workers, which additionally changes the workers' behavior. To
see the eects of income taxes on this mechanism, I introduce the tax function of Heathcote et al. (2017) who
represent the tax scheme as two parameters: the tax progressivity and the average tax rates. Changing the
parameters in the tax function, we could obtain the labor market equilibrium variables and the distribution
of workers across wages and assets, estimating the eects of the changes in the tax progressivity or the
average tax rates. Yet, to fully analyze the eects of tax policies, the model should be extended in future
work in twofold: Labor demand in this model is now exogenously given by one, and we can endogenize it
by introducing rms' entry and exit. Additionally, we could incorporate an ex-ante heterogeneity of workers
as well to capture the role of worker heterogeneity in labor market matching and the distribution of workers
across income and wealth.
While this paper mainly focuses on the model presentation, I provide simple simulations on three dierent
tax schemes. We rst set the baseline model and compare the equilibrium with those under the two more
progressive taxation systems. First reform is to have a higher tax progressivity, and we assume the baseline
economy has the tax progressivity as in the US, and then choose the higher tax progressivity in the UK.
We then also compare with the case where the tax progressivity increases the same as the rst reform,
but the average tax rates are adjusted to have the same tax revenues. The results show that the higher
tax progressivity reduces both the optimal search eort and the optimal savings, while the increase of the
average tax burden can oset the decrease in the optimal savings and search eort. Yet, these exercises
are solved based on the preliminary calibration values, and thus they may need to be analyzed with more
rigorous calibration in future work.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the equilibrium. In section
3, we set the model's calibration in which the values are mostly taken from the literature. We then solve for
the equilibrium numerically using the algorithm in Achdou et al. (2020), and show the results of two tax
reform simulations. Section 4 mentions the future work to be done in order to conduct the policy analysis
completely. Finally, section 5 concludes, and the appendices contain the derivations of the equations.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Literature on On-the-Job Search with Precautionary Savings
The model in this paper extends the model in Lise (2013), building on the strand of literature that integrates
job search into models of precautionary savings in the style of Bewley-Hugget-Aiyagari. Both the parts
integrated are key models of the macroeconomics: (i) The incomeplete-markets model of Bewley (1977),
Hugget (1993), and Aiyagari (1994), and (ii) The labor market search model departed from Diamond (1981),
Moretensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000). In the model of (i), workers choose their consumption and savings,
facing the labor income risks and a borrowing limit. They cannot fully insure against the risks due to the
incomplete markets. Yet, the labor market is frictionless, and therefore it can have only the exogenous job
separation when considering the unemployment. On the other hand, the model of (ii) does not consider the
wealth of workers. In this type of models, workers and rms search each other in the various ways of search,
and workers are assumed to use all the labor income for consumption at every period. Consequently, they
only take into account the felicity from current consumption and search eort and the value of expected
returns from work, not having the precationary motive.
Krusell, Mukoyama, and ahin (2010) and Lise (2013) are the pioneering papers in this strand of research.
Krusell et al. (2010) extends the Aiyagari (1994) model with endogenous job nding rate which is determined
in the labor market with Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides structure. This means that in the labor market,
rms post vacancies and match with workers according to the matching function, and the wages are set
through Nash bargaining. Using the structure, Krusell et al. (2010) showed rst that the share of surpluses
that workers derive from the match depends on their wealth. Because the model of Krusell et al. (2010) only
allows the job search to only unemployed workers, the employed workers become savers, and the unemployed
workers dissave to smooth consumption, becoming borrowers. Thus, the consumption smoothing is achieved
by two types of workers with extreme motives of job search and savings. The unemployed workers use their
ability to search for jobs and form the expectation on future income, and hence borrow to hit the borrowing
constraint. On the other hand, the precautionary motive of the employed workers is strengthened so that
the workers at the top of wealth distribution prefer to save even more, binding the upper bound of assets.
Since only a fraction of workers (unemployed workers) could search jobs, the role of wage ladder mechanism
as a self-insurance can be underestimated and the equilibrium outcome is rather close to Aiyagari (1994)
model without job search.
Lise (2013) incorporates on-the-job search into a partial equilibrium Hugget (1993) type model. Similar
to Krusell et al. (2010), risk averse workers choose search eort and can borrow or save using a risk free
asset. Yet, workers can search both on- and o-the job in Lise (2013)'s model, so as to account for large
job-to-job transitions observed in the data. Workers' search and savings behaviors are determined by the
asymmetric wage ladder mechanism, where there is an asymmetry between climbing and falling o the ladder.
The wage increases are generated in increments through the on-the-job search process, whereas the wage
decrease happens sharply from the current wages to the lowest rung of ladder due to the exogenous job loss
shock. Because of the asymmetry, workers' savings and search behaviors dier across the joint distribution
of earnings and wealth. This implies that the workers in low paying jobs prefer to dissave tapping the
expectation of wage growth, whereas the workers in high paying jobs choose to save to insure against the
possibility of job loss. Since the model assumes the ex-ante homogeneous workers, the authors use the sample
consisting soley of white males participating at the US economy to estimate the parameters in the model.
The model shows the good t with the aggregate distribution of wages, consumption, and wealth, as well as
the employment and wage dynamics in the data.
Yet, there exist the critiques that it is not appropriate for the policy analysis, since Lise (2013)'s model is
in a partial equilibrium. In the partial equilibrium setting, workers choose their optimal savings and search
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eort given the xed wage oer distribution of rms. In this case, the eect of policy ripples only through
the reduction/increment of the labor income. The expected return of the given search eort level (before
policies such as taxes or deductions are implemented) remains the same. This indicates that the partial
equilibrium model cannot capture the additional changes in optimal search eort and its consequent eects
on equilibrium labor distribution.
Similar to my model, Chaumont and Shi (2020) develop the model that integrates on-the-job search into
Hugget (1993) type model in a general equilibrium setting. Yet, the wage determination, search technology,
and the algorithm solving equilibrium are dierent from my model. The model of Chaumont and Shi (2020)
endogenizes the wage oer in the way that rms create vacancies for the submarkets which are indexed by
the wage oer and the potential workers' wealth. On the worker's side, workers with high wealth prefer to
wait for the high-wage oer, decumulating their wealth if they fail to form matches, whereas workers with low
wealth tend to choose the low-wage oer to be hired fast and accumulate wealth fast. Firms, therfore, prefer
to hire the wealthiest possible worker available in the submarket, since higher wealth implies a lower job
nding rate. Additionally, the authors assume the search technology of unemployed workers and employed
workers to be dierent. Unemployed workers meet the rm's wage oer with probability one, while they
accept or reject the oer. On the other hand, employed workers' meeting probability is estimated as the
job-to-job transition rate in the data. From the assumption of the heterogeneous search technology, the wage
dispersion is obtained suciently large as much as that in the data.
2.2 Literature on On-the-Job Search and Equilibrium Taxes
This paper is closely related to existing literature on quantitative evaluation of income tax policies. In
reality, income tax system has a very complex structure of various taxes and deductions that have dierent
conditions and limits. In the related literature, instead of introducing such a complex structure in the model,
researchers assume and estimate a tax function, focusing on the actual tax burden of agents. Developments
in general equilibrium heterogeneous-agents models enable researchers to address the policy analysis. The
Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget model quantitatively analyzes the impacts of taxes on precautionary savings and
intensive and extensive labor supply margins, yielding a cross-sectional wealth distribution as an equilibrium.
There have been several approaches to introduce the frictional labor market that extend upon the standard
Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget model. This is so that the models can incorporate both impacts on the search
intensity of workers and the response of rms (with regards to their wage oer distribution) by endogenizing
them.
Bagger, Moen and Vejlin (2017) study the impact of taxes on search choices of workers who are risk neutral
and heterogeneous in their productivity. The role of rms is simply set in that they just open vacancies and
oer wages to all workers as much as the output that may be created by the match. The workers accept
the oer whenever the oered wage is higher than their current wage. Thus, taxes do not aect the wage
formation or the job nding rate of other workers, meaning that externalities are only associated with the
choice of search intensity. In the model of Bagger et. al. (2017), the social planner solves the optimal
taxation problem by choosing the optimal net of tax income vector that maximises the social welfare which
is determined by the weighted sum of the net present lifetime income of unemployed workers. Then the
taxes are set as the output lessened by the net of tax wages. Solving the optimal taxation problem leads
to the planner balancing between two countervailing eects: a distributional eect and an incentive eect.
First, the distributional eect is caused by the concave welfare function. A positive distribution eect makes
the planner want to redistribute from high-paid to low-paid jobs. Second, the incentive eect considers the
eciency loss of taxes. The higher the rung is, the more fraction of workers that are aected in terms of
their search intensity. To limit the distortion on value creation, the planner wants to impose lower taxes
for jobs at higher rungs. Therefore, eciency concerns put a limit on how much can be reallocated. The
authors simulated the model using Danish data and compared the labor market outcomes of no tax, poll tax,
proportional tax, and optimal tax cases. They found that in the optimal taxation, search choices are less
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distorted than proportional tax and higher paid workers earn more net of tax income than poll tax, leading
to the largest social welfare among the three tax cases.
Sleet and Yazici (2017) highlight a prot channel of income and prot taxes, thereby modifying the
optimal tax formulas with worker heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Unlike Bagger et. al. (2017), the
eect of taxes ripples through the rms' contribution to the search process. There are sub-markets determined
by talents that workers are heterogeneous in, and rms sort themselves across the sub-markets. Then, they
choose how much to extract from worker output as prots, and the variation of extractiveness among rms
creates job ladders within the talent markets. In the model, the policymaker problem maximises expected
utility of payos subject to budget constraints. Solving the problem, higher marginal tax rates yield the
eects on distribution of prot-per-worker oers and on the threshold of talents active in the labor market
(in addition to the standard channel of workers' intensive margin that reduces output). The threshold of
talent is raised, and hence the maximal prot-per-worker oer decreases to retain marginal workers, poaching
workers from lower paying rms. This also reduces the prot-per-worker oer of such rms. Thus, the prot
channel refers to the additional eect of taxes on rm prots being squeezed and being redistributed to
workers. The impacts of the prot channel are twofold. First, within each talent market, workers at the
lower rungs of the job ladder benet more from prot squeeze. Second, prots are redistributed from low
talent markets to high talent markets, since high-talented workers are those who produce more output and
pay more rent to rms. Due to higher welfare weights for lower-paid jobs, optimal tax is determined by the
balance of the former and latter forces. Therefore, the direction of optimal marginal tax rates is not clear.
Using US data, the authors show that under the Ane tax which allows constant marginal tax rates and
lump sum transfers, the optimal tax rates become lower compared to the standard public nance model.
Bagger, Hejlesen, Sumiya and Vejlin (2018) provide the model closely related to this paper. They
analyze the eect of labor income taxation using the on-the-job search model with two-sided heterogeneity,
endogeneized job search eort, and equilibrium wage formation. The main dierence is that their model
assumes complete markets in which workers fully insure their income risk by trading a set of contingent
claims of consumption. That is, workers are heterogeneous only in their ability and type-a worker has the
identical consumption at time t, independent of current labor income and labor market status. Therefore,
the eects of income taxation are derived by the changes in the workers' search eorts and its impacts on the
wage oer distribution of rms, whereas my paper takes into account the channel of precautionary savings
and asset accumulation. The other dierence is that rm's wage policy is conditional on worker ability,
meaning the directed search of rms. To evaluate the tax reforms in Denmark, Bagger et. al. (2018) assume
the progressive tax function with three brackets and estimate the parameters to represent the increases in
marginal rates between brackets. They found Danish income tax reforms improved the equilibrium allocation
of labor, showing the decrease in the steady state unemployment rate and the increase in the steady state
labor income. Also, they provide the optimal taxation parameters that maximises the steady state aggregate
utility of workers.
On the other hand, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) develop an equilibrium model that nds
the optimal degree of tax progressivity. They estimate a tax function based on a simple parametric model
using the gross and disposable income of workers. In this functional form, the tax progressivity is represented
by a single parameter in the index. Their specication diers from the other traditional specications such
as the Ane taxes which are simple but have constant marginal rates, or very complex tax functions with
a number of parameters to estimate. The model has incomplete markets where workers with idiosyncratic
productivity shocks choose how many hours they work and invest in their skills. Unlike the literature
mentioned above, this model assumes a frictionless labor market, and therefore there is no search behavior of
workers and rms. The optimal tax progressivity is then chosen such that balances out the trade-o between




Time is continuous and the future is dicounted at rate ρ. The model basically extends Aiyagari-Bewley-
Hugget model to endogeneous labor supply and demand.
Two-sided Heterogeneity
On the one side, there is a continuum (a unit measure) of workers who are ex-ante identical, but become
endogenously heterogeneous ex post in their assets a ∈ [a, a] and wages w ∈ [w,w]. Ex-ante omogenous
workers are subject to idiosyncratic labor income risks with the lowest income state being interpreted as
the home production of unemployed workers. Because the income risks are only partially insurable by a
risk-free asset, workers' assets and wages evolve alongside the histories of search outcomes. On the other
side of the market, rms are heterogeneous in their productivity z ∈ [b, z] where b is home production value.
Productivity z is drawn from the exogenous distribution Γ(z), which is normalized to have z = b, because
rms with z < b should oer the wages w < b that workers will reject surely.
Worker Preferences
Workers derive utility from consumption of a composite good c and disutility from job search eort σ. The









where γ > 0 is the coecient of relative risk aversion, η > 1 is the elasticity of search costs, and µ > 0 is
a scaling parameter. As shown above, they are continuously dierentiable with u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, ψ′(·) >
0,and ψ′′(·) > 0. As we shall see below, the convexity of the search cost function and the concavity of the
utility function inuence the direction of the eects of taxes on worker's behavior.
Wage Ladder
In the frictional labor market, workers and rms should exert eort to form productive matches and have the
parts of the surplus of matches. Workers search both o- and on-the-job. A worker who is unemployed with
assets a and home production income b exerts job search eort σ(a, b). The job nding rate is described by
a Poisson arrival process, and the arrival rate depends positively on the search intensity: λσ(a, b), where λ
is the exogeneous job nding rate per unit of search eort. Similarly for the employed workers with assets a
and a labor income w exerts σ(a,w), and receives a job oer at rate λσ(a,w). It implies that the unemployed
and employed workers share the same search technology.
A job oer is drawn from the wage oer distribution F (w) with support [w,w]. F (w) is determined by the
rms posting a single wage w according to their productivity z prior to meeting a potential worker. Therefore,
the wage oer is endogeneous and is an equilibrium object. When a worker accepts the wage oer, then the
match is formed and the surplus is produced and shared between a worker and a rm immediately. Matches
are separated in one of two ways. First, a worker could be laid o exogeneously at the job destruction rate
δ. Then the worker becomes unemployed with home production value b. Second, a worker may quit his job
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to move to another rm oering higher wages as a result of on-the-job search. This endogeneously occurs at
rate λσ(a,w)F (w),where F (w) = 1− F (w).
Taxation
We introduce income taxation imposed on the sum of the labor income and interest income. We denote the
pre-tax income of an individual as y = w+ra. Then, we set the tax revenues as T (y) at every pretax income
level y. The log-linear form of T (y) is borrowed from the literature (e.g. Benabou, 2002; Heathcote et. al.,
2017) as follows:
T (y) = y − ϵy1−τ , 0 ≤ τ < 1 (1)
where τ reects the degree of tax progressivity, and ϵ shifts the tax function and controls the average tax
rates.1 T (y) is continuously dierentiable with 0 ≤ τ ′(y) < 1. Then, the disposable income y′ is given as
follows:
y′ = ϵy1−τ
Taking logs on both sides of equation (1) yields:
log(y′) = logϵ+ (1− τ)logy
1− τ denotes the elasticity of disposable income to gross income, which means when gross income increases
by 1%, disposable income increases by (1− τ)%. Additionally, and most importantly, 1− τ can be described




Thus, the tax progressivity is characterized in the sense that the marginal rate T ′(w) is larger than the
average tax rate T (w)w . τ > 0 means that the marginal tax rates are always larger than the average rates,
hence the taxation scheme is progressive, while τ < 0 indicates a regressive taxation scheme. When τ = 0,
the marginal rates and average rates are always constant as 1− ϵ for all pretax wage levels w, representing a
at tax. Consequently, the increase in parameter τ indicates a higher progressivity of a tax scheme. In the
case of ϵ, it depends negatively on the average rates of taxes.
3.2 Workers
A worker is innitely lived, and is risk averse. He saves (borrowes) at a risk-free interest rate r in the
incomplete markets where he could only partially insure against idiosyncratic employment risk. He has the






A worker is paid a gross income wt from a match between a worker and a rm, and could consume or
save a net of tax income ϵw1−τt . His wealth takes the form of bonds and evolves as follows:
ȧt = ϵ(wt + rtat)
1−τ − ct
The risk-free interest rate r is assumed to be less than the discount rate ρ, so that workers are not
too patient to have the precautionary motive of accumulating the assets innitely. A worker also faces a
borrowing limit




where −∞ < a < 02. Finally, workers' gross labor income evolves stochastically over time. Here, for
simplicity, we assume that the home production value of an unemployed worker b is also taxable. The changes
in the gross labor income are as follows:
dwt =
{
dqλσ1(υ(at, w̃t) ≥ υ(at, b))[w̃t − b] when unemployed,
dqλσ1(υ(at, w̃T ) ≥ υ(at, wt))[w̃t − wt] + dqδ[wt − b)] when employed,
where wages w̃ ∈ [b, w] is drawn from the wage oer distribution F (w), dqλσ = 1 if a job oer arrives and
0 otherwise, and dqδ = 1 if a job is exogeneously destroyed and 0 otherwise.
Then workers' consumption-saving decisions can be summarized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation. We should set up the HJB equations for the unemployed and the employed separately, using
the value of unemployment and the value of employment respectively. However, from Lise (2013), it is
known that w̃(a) = b is obtained by substituting each HJB equation into the reservation wage denition
υ(a, w̃(a)) = υu(a), where υu(a) denotes the value of being unemployed with assets a. This uses the
assumption that the search technology is identical for the unemployed and the employed. The result implies
that the reservation wage for an unemployed worker is constant as b, independently of assets. Consequently,
unemployment could be interpreted as the lowest rung of the job ladder, and therefore the HJB equations
for the unemployed and the employed could be represented as a single HJB equation for all workers.3 For




u (c) + λσ
∫
max (υ(a, w̃)− υ(a,w), 0) dF (w̃)
+ δ (υ(a, b)− υ(a,w)) + υa(a,w)
(





The ow value of being (un)employed with assets a and wages w is given by the felicity from consumption
c and search eort σ plus the expected change in the value of (un)employment. The value of (un)employment
changes in expectation in one of three ways. First, it increases by the product of the job er arrival rate
depending on the search eort and the expected net gain of receiving a wage oer w̃. Second, it decreases
by the product of the job destruction rate and the net loss of being laid o and losing the current wage
w. If the worker is currently unemployed, there is no income risk by unemployment, and therefore net loss
would be zero. Finally, due to the asset accumulation, the value of (un)employment changes as much as the
product of the savings policy function and the marginal value of assets.
The rst order conditions (FOCs) are given by:
u′(c) = υa(a,w) and, ψ
′(σ) = λ
∫
max (υ(a, w̃)− υ(a,w), 0) dF (w̃) (3)
Lemma 1.The value function in the HJB equation is strictly increasing in assets and income.
Proof. See Appendix. A.2.
Lemma 1 states that HJB is strictly incresing in assets and income and therefore optimal acceptance
decision is to accept any income higher than currently being paid.
Taking the derivative of HJB with respect to w using the Envelope theorem, and substituting υw(a,w)
into FOC on search eort yields the equation for optimal search eort.
2 Following Aiyagari (1994), we impose the natrual borrowing limit. In the steady state, the natural borrowing limit would









u′(c)ϵ(1− τ)(w̃ + ra)−τ + u′′(c)cw[ϵ(w + ra)1−τ − c]
ρ+ δ + λσF (w̃)
F (w̃)dw̃
The optimal search eort balances the marginal cost with the marginal expected return. Workers have
dierential search behavior across their assets and income: more assets dampen the precautionary motive
of savings which in turn reduces the desire for a higher income, and higher wages resultantly decrease the
probability of being reallocated to an even higher rung of job ladder. Additionally, the convexity of the search
cost function and the concavity of the utility function also aect the optimal search eort: the optimal search
eort is inversely related to the convexity of the search cost function and positively related to the concavity
of the utility function. Then, introducing income taxation distorts the choice of optimal search eort. First,
receiving a disposable income net of taxes reduces available permanent income, which therefore decreases
the optimal consumption c, leading to a higher u′(c) and more negative u′′(c). Second, in the numerator,
τ -related terms multiplied by u′(c) and u′′(c)have the opposite impacts, reducing the absolute values of the
two terms. The intuition is that the expected return of the search eort decreases overall, but the decrease
is partially oset by the curvature of the utility function. The more progressive the tax scheme is, the larger
these eects might be. Lastly, income taxation and the changes in the worker's search behavior also induce
the corresponding responses of rms on the wage oer distribution F (w), which will be analyzed below.
Similarly, taking the derivative of HJB with respect to a, applying the Envelope theorem, and substituting






















The equation accounts for the savings behavior of workers across the dierent rungs of a wage ladder.
First, before income taxation (τ = 0, ϵ = 1), r − ρ represents the relative importance of time preferences to
the interest rate. Due to the identical time preferences among workers, this term is constant across workers'
assets and income. Second, the λσ-related term determines the eects of the expected return of on-the-job
search. The higher the current wages, the lower the chance of experiencing a wage increase through job
transition. The marginal utility of consumption is also lower with higher current wages, because the optimal
consumption increases along the amount of wages. Therefore, being at a higher rung leads to the higher
optimal growth of consumption, implying more savings. Third, the δ-related term aects the precautionary
savings of workers. The more distant from the value of home production b the current wages are, the higher
the marginal utility rate. This strengthens the motive for precautionary savings. Then, introducing income
taxation aects the optimal savings. First, the interest income at each period under income taxation is
smaller than risk-free interest rate r, which means (ϵ(1 − τ)(ra + w)−τr < r). This lowers the optimal
growth of consumption, reducing savings. Second, the λσ-related term is also inuenced by the changes in
the wage oer distribution F (w) and the marginal utility from consumption. The marginal utility increases
due to decrease in consumption, and as we shall see, given the wages w, the income taxes decrease F (w).
Third, the δ-related term also changes due to the changes in the marginal utility.
3.3 Asset Market
The equilibrium of the asset market is a steady-state joint distribution of assets and income, which we
denote g(a,w) and an equilibrium interest rate that is pinned down by the level of aggregate savings. The

















+ λf(w)σ(a, b)g(a, b) (5)
4The interest rate r is pinned down by the requirement that, in a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate








This implies that the equilibrium interest rate is such that balances out the demand and supply of assets to
smooth consumption.
3.4 Firms
The present discounted value of a rm of productivity z, hiring a worker of wage w with asset level a is given
by the Bellman equation below.
ρJ(a,w, z) = z − w + Ja(a,w, z)s(a,w)−
(
δ + λσ(a,w)F (w)
)
J(a,w, z) (7)
The ow value of hiring a worker of assets a with wages w is given by the sum of the output of the match
z minus the wages w and the expected chnges in the value of a lled job. The value of a job changes in
expectation in one of three ways. First, a job is separated exogenously at a rate of δ. Second, the workers of
one rm can be poached by another rm oering higher wages. The possibility of loss positively depends on
the intensity of on-the-job search of the worker. When the job separation or poaching occurs, the match is
dissolved and produces zero output, therefore rendering zero prots for the current rm. Finally, the asset
accumulation of workers also aects the value of a lled job. Since more assets lessen the optimal search
eort of workers, the probability of a job transition decreases and a worker stays longer in the current rm.
Arranging the Bellman equation yields:
(
ρ+ δ + λσ(a,w)F (w)
)
J(a,w, z) = z − w + Ja(a,w, z)s(a,w)
When hiring a worker, rms sample potential workers who vary in assets and wages from a sampling











Where S is the aggregate measure of searchers
S :=
∫ a(






4 See Appendix A.3 for the derivation.
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The rst order condition satises∫

















A rm's wage policy is the best response to the worker's savings and search behaviours, as well as the
expected loss of exogenous layos and other rms' wage oers drawn from F (w). Thus, a rm should
consider the trade-o between the prots after paying wages and the expected loss from worker turnover
when choosing how much to oer to a potential worker. Then, rms with low productivity oer low wages,
and rms with high productivity oer high wages, implying w′(z) > 0.
Introducing income taxation aects the rm's wage oer through changes in workers' savings and search
behaviours, as well as other rms' wage policies. Progressive taxes reduce the workers' asset target levels and
optimal search eorts, which lessens worker turnover. Therefore, workers have a lower probability of being
poached, because their on-the-job search is less active than it would be with the absence of taxes. Consider
the rm with very low productivity paying wages just above the home production value b. Facing income
taxation, the rm would oer wages even closer to b, since there is less probability for workers to meet with
another rm oering higher wages. This aects the wage oer of rms with higher productivity trying to
poach from a rm with lower productivity. This mechanism additionally lowers the wage oer value. In sum,
the presence of progressive taxes causes the support of the pretax distribution of wages to shift downwards
and become more compressed.
3.5 Government and Optimal Income Taxation
The government obtains the income tax revenue, and spends on government purchases, G, which do not
directly enter into the worker's utility. We assume that government has the balanced government budget.
The tax revenue is determined by the tax progressivity parameter τ and the average tax rate parameter ϵ











To simulate the model in the benchmark economy, I borrow the calibrated values of parameters from the
existing literature. I note here that the model calibration described in this section is preliminary, thus some
of the parameters need to be adjusted to match the target moment calculated using the microdata in future
work. The model is calibrated to a yearly frequency. The parameters encompass the felicity function, job
search process, and the tax system.
We rst have the coecient of relative risk aversion γ. According to Attanasio (1999), the coecient of
relative risk aversion lies in between 1 and 2 in most of the existing literature. We then set the γ at two as in
Lise (2013). For disutility of search, we assume search costs are quadratic with η = 2 and µ = 1. We then have
the parameters for job search process: job contact rate λ, and job destruction rate δ. Here the parameters are
xed at exogenous rate, and they should match the labor market target moments. We borrow the values of
λ = 0.6 and δ = 0.1 from Lise (2013) who estimates the moments for the white male sample of the US labor
market. The parameters are the same across the unemployed and the employed workers, which means that
the model assumes the identical search technology for o- and on-the-job search. For a rm heterogeneity
in productivity z, we assume the beta distribution Γ(z) = B( zβ0 ;β1,β2) with β0 = 0.5, β1 = 2, β2 = 5.
Finally, we set the parameters for the tax system. As seen in section 2, the government imposes progressive
taxes on the sum of labor income and interest income of workers. Heathcote et al. (2017) estimated the
income tax progressivity in the US economy as 0.181, but this estimate is based on the income taxes on
households, not on the individual workers. Thus, the tax progressivity parameters are taken from Holter et al.
(2019) who estimate the tax progressivity parameter based on taxes imposed on average earnings of employed
individuals over the period of 2000 - 2007. The tax progressivity parameter τ for the US economy (0.138) and
the UK economy (0.200) are borrowed to analyze the countries with less/more progressive taxation systems,
respectively. The average tax controls ϵ are calculated to match the UK tax-to-GDP rate (0.330).
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Target
ρ = 0.05 time preference (standard in macro calibration)
γ = 2 relative risk aversion (standard in macro calibration)
µ = 1 search costs scale (Lise, 2013)
η = 2 elasticity of search costs w.r.t. eort (Lise, 2013)
λ = 0.6 job contact rate (Lise, 2013)
δ = 0.1 job destruction rate (Lise, 2013)








progressivity of income tax (Holter et al., 2019)
ϵ = 0.751 average level of income tax
4.2 A Stationary Equilibrium
As shown in Section 2, workers' search and consumption-saving decisions are characterized by a HJB equa-
tion, and rms' wage oer decision is determined by the Bellman equation that maximizes the expected
prots from hiring a worker. Then, the joint distribution of workers across income and wealth is summarized
with another dierential equation: a KF equation. Finally, the interest rate r is pinned down in equilibrium
by the fact that bonds are in zero net supply. A stationary equilibrium is therefore represented by the
following system of the dierential equations (2), (4), and (5), together with (3), (8), and (9), and the equi-
librium relationship (6). To solve the equilibrium numerically, I use the nite dierence algorithm developed
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in Achdou et al. (2020) for solving the HJB equation of workers and the wage determination of rms.5
4.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we simulate the model under the three tax systems. First, we set the benchmark economy
with low progressivity (τ = 0.138) and the average tax rates (ϵ = 0.752) calculated to match the UK average
tax rates. We then compare the results with the steady state after the progressive tax reform to a higher
tax progressivity (as in the UK). Finally, we additionally compare them to the case where the government
chooses the higher tax progressivity, but increases the level of taxes so that the total tax revenue does not
change.
4.3.1 The eects of the progressive tax reform
In this simulation, we increase the tax progressivity parameter τ from 0.138 into 0.200, and then solve for
the new steady state under the progressive tax reform. The results show how workers' search and savings
patterns change and therefore how the equilibrium price rates in the model are aected. The increase in the
tax progressivity reduces the relative slope of the disposable income for the workers with a higher income
compared to that for the workers with a lower income, imposing more burden to the higher income workers.
5See the technical details in Appendix. B.
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Figure 1 and gure 2 show the search and savings behaviors, and the stationary wealth distribution
under the two dierent tax schemes τ = 0.138 and τ = 0.2 respectively. To make the average tax rates
equal, controls ϵ is adjusted from 0.752 when τ = 0.138, to 0.712 when τ = 0.2. Across the panels, the policy
functions conditional on assets a of the workers receiving wages w are represented. In panels (a) and (b) of
both gure 1 and gure 2, both the savings and search eort policies are decreasing in assets. We also nd
that the unemployed workers choose the highest search eort given the equal assets, while they dissave most,
hitting the borrowing constraint in panel (c). As the wages w increase, the optimal search eorts decrease
and the precautionary savings increase, showing the zero search eort and the highest savings behavior at
the highest rung of wage ladder. On the other hand, the steady-state distribution of workers are represented
in panel (c). The density of unemployed workers g(a, b) explodes as a → a and therefore there is a spike in
the density g(a, b) at a.
Comparing the panel (a)'s of the gure 1 and gure 2, when the tax progressivity becomes higher, savings
and borrowings of workers both shrink. This is because the presence of the progressive taxes dampens the
motive of consumption smoothing. Panel (b)'s of gure 1 and gure 2 clearly show that the higher tax
progressivity distorts the search eort more, reducing workers' search intensity, and therefore leading to less
active job search of workers.
Table 2: The Eects of the Progressive Tax Reform
r E(w) E(σ) E(c) u (%)
τ = 0.138 0.026 0.154 0.50 0.150 11.4
τ = 0.200 0.031 0.152 0.48 0.153 12.1
Table 2 describes the equilibrium labor market outcomes under the dierent tax schemes. The more
progressive the tax scheme is, the more increases in equilibrium interest rate are, due to the weakened
motive of the precautionary savings. The average search eort decreases, and therefore the average wage
oer decreases. Since the search intensity decreases, workers would remain in the status of unemployment
longer than they would do in the less progressivity case. Consequently, this leads to the higher equilibrium
unemployment rate. Average consumption increases as the motive of savings is weakened.
4.3.2 The eects of the revenue-neutral progressive tax reform
In the simulation of section 1.3.1., the higher tax progressivity reduces the average wages and savings policies,
leading to slower asset accumulation. Consequently, the gross income ra+w of workers also becomes smaller,
and therefore the tax revenue of the government also decreases. In this section, we simulate the model
adjusting the average tax rate so as to have the equal tax revenue in both the taxation schemes. We thus
simulate the model with the more progressive scheme (τ = 0.200) with ϵ adjusted into 0.668, which is smaller
than that of the progressive tax reform in the previous section.
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Comparing gure 3 with gure 1 of the baseline calibration, in panel (a), the savings policy function
seems almost the same under the baseline and the revenue-neutral tax scheme. The higher average tax rates
thus oset the decrease in precautionary motive of savings. Yet, the distribution of workers across wealth
is compressed downward, since the average tax rates of workers increase to maintain the same tax revenues
as in the baseline. In panel (b), due to the higher tax progressivity, the optimal search eorts decrease, but
the decrease is smaller than the progressive tax reform without the change in the average tax rate.
Table 3: The Eects of the Revenue-neutral Progressive Tax Reform
r E(w) E(σ) E(c) u
Baseline 0.026 0.154 0.50 0.150 11.4
Progressive Reform 0.031 0.152 0.48 0.153 12.1
Revenue-neutral Progressive Reform 0.033 0.153 0.49 0.148 11.9
Table 3 compares the equilibrium labor market outcomes of the three tax schemes: the baseline, progres-
sive reform and revenue-neutral progressive reform. Compared to the baseline model, the revenue-neutral
reform increases the interest rate and the unemployment rate, and lowers the average wages and average
search eort, since the higher tax progressivity distorts the search eort and savings decision. Yet, the average
consumption decreases, because the higher average tax rates reduce the disposable income of workers.
Compared to the progressive reform without the change in the average tax rate, the optimal search eort
slightly increases, because, given the xed tax progressivity, the higher average tax rates reduces disposable
income, and hence to smooth consumption, workers strengthen the search intensity. This therefore increases
the possibility of the employed workers meeting other rms oering higher wages, and the average wage oer
should increase as well. Hence the employment rate is in between the baseline and the progressive reform,




As mentioned above, we should ensure a more rigorous calibration of the model for further research. In order
to match the target parameters (such as δ, µ,and η), recalibration is necessary. Additionally and crucially,
the model will be adapted twofold: First, the rms' free entry condition will be introduced to endogenize
the labor demand in the model. Second, an ex-ante worker heterogeneity would be introduced to capture
the additional role of workers in the wage ladder mechanism, and account for the larger wage dispersion.
5.1 Firm Entry and Exit
In the paper's model, all rms in the economy search for workers, and oer wages conditional on their
productivity z ∈ [b, z] drawn from the exogenous distribution Γ(z).Workers then choose their search eort
to meet the vacancies, considering the rate at which workers meet vacancies, which is exogenously given as
the parameter λ.
This paper remains condent in the likelihood that rm entry and exit is the future of work. Essentially,
the model will incorporate a rm's decision to post a vacancy, obtaining the meeting function depending
on the search eort of workers and the vacancies of rms. Given the cost of posting a vacancy and the
expected return from a potential worker, rms choose whether to post a vacancy or not, and how much to
oer, according to the worker's productivity z ∈ [z0, z]. The free entry condition will then ensure that a
potential entrant rm must be indierent about posting a vacancy. In this respect, labor demand can be
endogenized and represented by the total number of vacancies and meetings of workers and rms. In this
search process, rms consider the rate at which they contact a potential worker q. In the model, the rates
at which rms contact workers (q) and which workers meet rms (λ), and the productivity threshold (z0)
are the equilibrium objects.
With the free entry condition, we can consider the eects of prot taxation whose distortionary eects
ripple through the rms' entry and exit, and the derived eects on rms' wage policies. The optimal taxes
are then chosen as the value such that achieves the ecient match in the labor market. If the vacancies are
too many relative to the search eort of workers, raising the taxes on prots will reduce the number of rms
entering and therefore raise q. In the case that this were reversed, raising the taxes on workers' income will
raise λ.In this way, the optimal taxation will be associated with how much burden should be imposed on
each economic agent.
5.2 Worker Heterogeneity
We should furthermore extend the model to incorporate an ex-ante worker heterogeneity. In this paper,
we assume that workers are ex-ante identical, but become ex-post heterogeneous as in the model of Lise
(2013). Consequently, the model attributes all of the wage dispersion to the labor income risk. Yet, in
reality, some workers just earn persistently higher than other workers due to their ability. Reecting the
worker heterogeneity in ability will change the savings and search patterns of workers, in addition to the
wage oer of rms across the ability distribution of workers. For example, the worker with low wealth and
low ability may be willing to accept even lower wages than in this paper, and the worker with high wealth
and high ability may accept a wage oer even higher than in this paper. Hence, it is expected that the wage
and wealth distribution will be widened across workers.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eects of income taxes in a search equilibrium model with risk-averse workers
who accumulate wealth to smooth consumption in the incomplete markets. Workers search both o and
on the job. Workers optimally choose their search eort and savings according to their income and wealth,
accumulating or decumulating their wealth. The optimal search and savings decrease in wealth. Firms
oer wages conditional on productivity ex ante of meeting, solving the prot maximizing problem. As a
result of the behaviors of workers and rms in the frictional labor market, ex-ante identical workers become
heterogeneous endogenously. The presence and the changes in the income taxation system then distort the
interaction between wealth accumulation and job search, and thus aect the equilibrium allocation of labor
across income and wealth. From the literature, we borrow the functional form of taxes that explains the tax
scheme with two parameters: the tax progressivity and average tax rates. This paper then has analyzed the
eects of the increase of the tax progressivity. In simulation, we show that a higher tax progressivity reduces
the optimal search eort due to the decrease in the expected return of on-the-job search, and also reduces
the savings due to the weakened motive of consumption smoothing.
There are two extensions of this model to be done in future. First, labor demand should be endogenized
in the model. This therefore needs the rms' decision on whether to post a vacancy or not to be solved in
the model. This will enable to nd the ecient match that balances out the total number of search and the
total number of vacancies. Second, an ex-ante worker heterogeneity can be introduced, while in this model
we assume the homogenous workers in their ability, and emphasize how they become heterogeneous in their
income and wealth as the result of the labor market outcomes. This will ensure that the model has a better
t to the data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of HJB equation
We derive the HJB equations of the unemployed and the employed from a discrete-time equation with time
periods of length ∆t and then taking the limit as ∆t → 0, and then show that the HJB equations of the
unemployed and the employed can be written as the single equation.
υ(a,w, t) = max
c∈[0,a−a],σ≥0
〈






max{υ(a+∆a, w̃, t+∆t), υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t)}dF (w̃)
+δ∆tU(a+∆a, t+∆t) + (1− λσ∆t − δ∆t)υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t) + o(∆t)]
〉
where o(∆t) is the term that goes to zero faster than ∆t. Mutiplying 1 + ρ∆t yields
ρ∆tυ(a,w, t) = max
c∈[0,a−a],σ≥0
〈
(1 + ρ∆t) [u (c(a,w, t))− ψ(σ(a,w, t)]∆t
+ [λσ∆t
∫
max{υ(a+∆a, w̃, t+∆t) − υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t), 0}dF (w̃)
+δ∆t[U(a+∆a, t+∆t)−υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t)]+[υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t)−υ(a,w, t)]+o(∆t)]
〉
Dividing by ∆t and taking the limit as ∆t → 0, we obtain
ρυ(a,w, t) = max
c∈[0,a−a],σ≥0
〈
(1 + ρ∆t) [u (c(a,w, t))− ψ(σ(a,w, t)]
+ [λσ
∫
max{υ(a+∆a, w̃, t+∆t) − υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t), 0}dF (w̃)
+δ[U(a+∆a, t+∆t)−υ(a+∆a, w, t+∆t)]+
















ρυ(a,w, t) = max
c∈[0,a−a],σ≥0
〈
[u (c(a,w, t))− ψ(σ(a,w, t)]
+ [λσ
∫
max{υ(a, w̃, t) − υ(a,w, t), 0}dF (w̃)
+ δ[U(a, t) − υ(a,w, t)] + υa(a,w, t)
(





A.2 HJB increasing in w and a
Dene asterisk notation as an agent's optimal decision. Given assets a and income w, c∗ denes optimal
consumption level, σ∗ the optimal search eort and W ∗ the set of all wage oers one will accept. Substitute
these optimal decisions and the rst order condition for consumption gives the expression
υ(a,w) =
1





υ(a, w̃)dF (w̃) + δυ(a, b)
+ u′(c∗))
(





Where for example, c∗ is the optimal level of consumption, given a and w, by the envelope condition for
arbitrary â and ŵ we know that
υ(â, ŵ) ≥ 1





υ(â, w̃)dF (w̃) + δυ(â, b)
+ u′(c∗))
(





Substituting in the expression for υ(a,w) gives
υ(â, ŵ) ≥ υ(a,w) +
u′(c∗))
(
r(â− a) + ϵ(ŵ1−τ − w1−τ )
)
ρ+ δ + λσ∗
.
Thus for â > a, υ(â, w) > υ(a,w) and for ŵ > w and τ ̸= 1, υ(a, ŵ) > υ(a,w).
A.3 Joint distribution of assets and income
Forgetting temporarily about income changes, assuming s(a,w) ≤ 0, the case of s(a,w) > 0 is symmetric.
Pr(ãt+∆t ≤ a) = Pr(ãt ≤ a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
already below threshold a
+ Pr(a ≤ ãt ≤ a−∆ts(a,w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross threshold a
= Pr(ãt ≤ a−∆ts(a,w))
So, the probability a worker of wage w has assets a′ ∈ (a−∆a, a+∆a] is given by
Pr(a−∆a < ãt+∆t ≤ a+∆a) =Pr(ãt ≤ a+∆a −∆ts(a+∆a, w))− Pr(ãt ≤ a−∆a −∆ts(a−∆a, w))
Dene the cdf G(a,w, t) as the measure of workers earning less than a wage w and endowed with assets less
than a at time t.6 The cdf G(a,w, t) is dened teh integral of the joint pdf g(a,w, t), such that
G(a,w, t) =
∫ w ∫ a
g(a′, w′, t)da′dw′.
Thus the derivative of G(a,w, t) with respect to w is labelled Gw(a,w, t) and is the measure of workers
earning a wage w with assets less than or equal to a. Consider an unemployed worker with income b. The
change in the measure of workers with assets a′ ∈ (a −∆a, a + ∆a] in a period of time ∆t is given by the
expression below.










(Gw′(a+∆a −∆ts(a+∆a, w′), w′, t)−Gw′(a−∆a −∆ts(a−∆a, w′), w′, t)) dw′
The rst term on the right hand side are those workers who do not nd a better paying job and remain in
the asset bound. The second term captures workers who were previously employed and are laid o and fall
6In steady-state the distribution will be time invariant but it helps with the exposition to include t at this stage.
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within the asset boundary. Subtract both sides by Gw(a + ∆a, b, t) − Gw(a − ∆a, b, t), divide by ∆t, and




Gw(a+∆a, b, t+∆t)−Gw(a+∆a, b, t)
∆t
− Gw(a−∆a, b, t+∆t)−Gw(a−∆a, b, t)
∆t
〉
= ∂tGw(a+∆a, b, t)− ∂tGw(a−∆a, b, t) which in steady-state
= 0














= −s(a+∆a, b)g(a+∆a, b, t) given, steady-state
= −s(a+∆a, b)g(a+∆a, b)
Dropping the t subscripts, the whole expression can be written as
0 = −s(a+∆a, b)g(a+∆a, b) + s(a−∆a, b)g(a−∆a, b)









Dividing by 2∆a and take limit as ∆a → 0.
∂
∂a




For w > b, the same approach is followed, so












Gw′(a+∆a −∆ts(a+∆a, w′), w′, t)−Gw′(a−∆a −∆ts(a−∆a, w′), w′, t)
)
dw′
+∆tλf(w)σ(a, b) (Gw(a+∆a −∆ts(a+∆a, b), b, t)−Gw(a−∆a −∆ts(a−∆a, b), b, t))
Successively, both sides of the above expression are subtracted by Gw(a + ∆a, w, t) − Gw(a − ∆a, w, t),
divided by ∆t, and the limit taken as ∆t → 0.
0 = −s(a+∆a, w)g(a+∆a, w) + s(a−∆a, w)g(a−∆a, w)









+ λf(w)σ(a, b) (Gw(a+∆a, b)−Gw(a−∆a, b))
Dividing by 2∆a and take limit as ∆a → 0.
∂
∂a




+ λf(w)σ(a, b)g(a, b) (KF: employed)
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B Numerical Appendix
B.1 Solving HJB (Implicit 1)
i = 1, 2...I, asset grid, j = 0, 1..J wage grid.
υn+1i,j − υni,j
∆

































Collecting terms with identical subscripts on the right hand side,
υn+1i,0 − υni,0
∆
+ ρυn+1i,0 = u(c
n
i,0)− ψ(σni,0) + υn+1i−1,0xi,0 + υ
n+1










and for j > 0,
υn+1i,j − υni,j
∆
+ ρυn+1i,j = u(c
n























































1,3 · · · U n1,J
L 0 Dn2 U
n







L 0 0 0 · · · DnJ
 where, Dnj =

y1,j z1,j 0 0 · · · 0
x2,j y2,j z2,j 0 · · · 0











λσ1,jfj′ 0 0 · · · 0
0 λσ2,jfj′ 0 · · · 0






0 0 0 0 λσI,jfj′
 and L =

δ 0 0 · · · 0
0 δ 0 · · · 0






0 0 0 0 δ





max (υ(a, w̃)− υ(a,w), 0) dF (w̃)
µση = λσ
∫

















































Dn0 0 0 0 · · · 0
L Dn1 0 0 · · · 0







L 0 0 0 · · · DnJ

B.3 Solving KF Equations



















































BOUNDED C = 0
Returning to equation (KF: unemployed),


























= −s(a, b)g(a, b)
s(a,w)


























B.4 Solving Firm Wage Posting
Grid of z = {z1, z2, ...zN} that approximates a continuous support. We look for a solution in which w′(z) > 0
and we assume that if a rm draws a type z = b the corresponding wage oer is w(b) = b. Since no worker
would accept a lower wage oer they opt to hire the worker making zero prot. We start at the lowest value
for z and build the corresponding wage grid sequentially.
1. Solve (iteratively) the equation(
ρ+ δ + λσ(a,w)F (w)
)
J(a,w, z) = z − w + Ja(a,w, z)s(a,w)
At point z with corresponding wage w this gives us a value for J(a,w, z) and Ja(a,w, z) for every value
on our asset grid.
2. Guess a value of w′(z).
3. Solve (iteratively) the equation below, using the computed values of J(a,w, z) and Ja(a,w, z) and the
guess at w′(z).
(
ρ+ δ + λσ(a,w)Γ(z)
)







− 1 + s(a,w)Jaw(a,w, z) + sw(a,w)Ja(a,w, z)
4. Update our guess for w′(z) from the FOC below, using the bisection method.∫
J(a,w, z)Φaw(a,w)da = −
∫
Jw(a,w, z)Φa(a,w)da
If RHS is too large then that implies w′(z) is too small and vice-versa. Return to step 2 until covergence.
5. Once w′(z) has been solved the next point on the wage grid can be computed as
wi+1 = w
′(zi) (zi+1 − zi)
7Using, a quotient rule for integration, see here.∫
f ′(x)
g(x)
dx =
f(x)
g(x)
+
∫
f(x)g′(x)
[g(x)]2
dx.
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